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Abstract—Crowdsourced mobile video streaming enables
nearby mobile video users to aggregate network resources to
improve their video streaming performances. However, users are
often selfish and may not be willing to cooperate without proper
incentives. Designing an incentive mechanism for such a scenario
is challenging due to the users’ asynchronous downloading
behaviors and their private valuations for multi-bitrate encoded
videos. In this work, we propose both single-object and multi-
object multi-dimensional auction mechanisms, through which
users sell the opportunities for downloading single and multiple
video segments with multiple bitrates, respectively. Both auction
mechanisms can achieve truthfulness (i.e, truthful private infor-
mation revelation) and efficiency (i.e., social welfare maximiza-
tion). Simulations with real traces show that crowdsourced mobile
streaming facilitated by the auction mechanisms outperforms
noncooperative streaming by 48.6% (on average) in terms of
social welfare. To evaluate the real-world performance, we also
construct a demo system for crowdsourced mobile streaming and
implement our proposed auction mechanism. Experiments over
the demo show that those users who provide resources to others
and those users who receive helps can increase their welfares by
15.5% and 35.4% (on average) via cooperation, respectively.
Index Terms—Mobile video streaming, mobile crowdsourcing,
incentive mechanism, multi-dimensional auction
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Mobile video traffic accounted for around 55% of global
mobile traffic in 2015, and is expected to grow at an annual
rate of 62% between 2015 and 2020 [3]. The increasing video
demand requires proper resource allocation methods to achieve
desirable user’s quality of experience (QoE) in increasingly
congested wireless networks with limited radio resources. A
key challenge to achieve this is that different users can have
very different QoE requirements (e.g., depending on device
screen sizes and user preferences) and channel conditions (e.g.,
3G cellular, 4G cellular, or WiFi links). To resolve and exploit
the heterogeneity among users and deal with the potential
mismatch of video requirements and channel conditions at
the individual user level, researchers have recently proposed a
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Fig. 1. Crowdsourced Mobile Streaming.
crowdsourced mobile streaming (CMS) system [4] that enables
mobile users to form cooperative groups and share their
network resources for more effective mobile video streaming.
The CMS system is very suitable for the adaptive bitrate
video streaming (ABR) technology [5], a widely used video
streaming technology in HTTP networks. In ABR, a video
is partitioned into multiple video segments, and each video
segment is encoded at multiple bitrates. A video user can
choose the bitrate of each segment based on his preference
and the real-time network condition. Hence, ABR-based video
streaming provides a good amount of flexibility for cooperative
downloading in the CMS system.
Figure 1 shows an example of the CMS system with three
users, where each user watches a unique video hosted by the
corresponding server. User C does not have a cellular connec-
tion to the Internet, so both user A and user B download user
C’s segments and forward to user C. User A also downloads a
segment for user B, as he has a better downlink channel (4G)
than user B (3G). In the CMS system, the downloading links
from the Internet to users can be either cellular links or WiFi
links, and the connections among users can be either WiFi
Direct links or Bluetooth. In order to make the presentation
easy to follow, we will refer to all the downloading links as
“cellular links” and all the connections among users as “WiFi
Direct links”; these are merely terminology choices that do
not limit the applicability of the system.
The CMS system is different from the device-to-device
(D2D) based [6]–[8] and peer-to-peer (P2P) based [9]–[12]
video streaming models, where users share their downloaded
video segments with other users through D2D links and the
Internet, respectively. In the CMS system, users share their
cellular network resources (for segments downloading), hence
it is mainly targeted at the much more common application
scenario that different users watch different videos. Different
from the bandwidth aggregation (BA) models that aggregate
multiple users’ bandwidth to serve one user’s streaming need
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2[13]–[15], the CMS system aggregates multiple users’ band-
width to satisfy all users’ video streaming needs, enhancing
the users’ QoE through proper network resource allocation.
A major challenge for realizing the CMS system is that
helping others will increase mobile users’ cost, so the mobile
users may not be willing to cooperate unless they receive
proper incentives. In other words, the success of such a CMS
system requires a proper incentive mechanism that motivates
mobile users to crowdsource their network resources for
cooperative video segments downloading.
B. Solution Approach and Contribution
In this work, we focus on the incentive mechanism design
for the CMS system. Namely, we aim to design such mecha-
nisms that offer enough compensation for each video user to
download video segments for others, considering the user’s
own service request and downloading cost. The proposed
mechanism needs to consider the following questions for each
segment that each user (downloader) downloads:
• Receiver Selection: Whose segment will the downloader
download?
• Bitrate Adaption: What bitrate (quality) will the receiver
choose for the segment to be downloaded?
• Cost Compensation: How much will the downloader be
compensated for his downloading cost by the receiver?
It is challenging to design an effective incentive mechanism
that addresses above questions, because of the users’ private
valuations for multi-bitrate encoded video segments as well
as their asynchronous downloading behaviors. First, a user’s
valuation for a segment at a particular bitrate is the user’s
private information and can vary over time. The diverse and
varying private valuation induces difficulties in evaluating
users’ contributions in cooperation and determining the proper
incentive levels. Second, video scheduling in ABR is segment
based instead of time-slot based, so it is challenging to
schedule the downloading cooperation among the users who
request and download videos at different times.
Auction is widely used for allocating objects among the
users who have private valuations. Hence, we propose auction-
based incentive mechanisms for the CMS to handle the users’
private valuation revelation. To address the asynchronous
operations, we consider decentralized mechanisms: when a
user (downloader) is ready to download new segments, he will
initiate an auction to decide for whom to download at what
bitrate with what price. In other words, the downloader acts as
an auctioneer, and his nearby users (who request videos) act as
bidders, bidding for the segment downloading opportunities.
Classical single-dimensional auction, where a bidder sub-
mits a single value indicating his willingness-to-pay, is not
applicable in our crowdsourced model. This is because the
video segments are encoded at multiple bitrates in ABR, so a
bidder needs to specify multi-dimensional information in the
bid, i.e., his intended bitrate and the price he is willing to
pay for such a bitrate. This motivates us to consider a multi-
dimensional auction in this work.
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Fig. 2. Theoretical Framework of This Paper.
As a benchmark, we first propose a single-object multi-
dimensional auction (SOMD) [16] based incentive mechanism
framework for the CMS system, where an auctioneer allocates
one segment in one auction. Based on the SOMD framework,
we propose a second-score auction-based mechanism that
ensures the truthful user valuation revelation in the CMS
system. Through a proper design of the score function (to be
discussed in Section IV-A2), we derive the efficient mechanism
that maximizes the social welfare.
However, such a single-object allocation may induce ex-
tensive signaling overhead because of the frequently initiated
auctions, which may negatively affect the video streaming
performance. This motivates us to consider a multi-object
multi-dimensional auction that enables auctioneers to allo-
cate multiple segments in one auction. Such a multi-object
allocation introduces an additional dimension in the bidding
process—the quantity (the number of the segments that a bid-
der desires), which is preferential dependent1 of price. It has
been shown in [18] that designing a multi-dimensional auction
with preferential dependent dimensions is extremely difficult,
but it turns out to be the problem that we need to solve. In this
work, we propose a multi-object multi-dimensional (MOMD)
auction framework, which enables bidders to bid for multiple
objects (i.e., segments) with different bitrates in each auction.
Within the MOMD framework, we design the allocation rule
and payment rule, which leads to a truthful Vickrey-score
auction. By a proper design of the score function, we propose
an efficient mechanism that maximizes the social welfare.
Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical framework of this paper.
The single-object and multi-object mechanisms assume that
every user who is close to a downloader (and watches a
video) will participate in the auction (when the downloader
is ready to sell his downloading opportunities). Although
the mechanisms maximize the social welfare in each auction
(under a properly chosen score function), the long-term social
welfare across multiple rounds of auction may not necessarily
be maximized in some cases. For example, if a downloader’s
channel condition is very poor (at the time he initiates the
auction), then it might be wise for the nearby users to refrain
from bidding and wait for a different downloader (with a better
channel condition) to become available. Therefore, we will
further modify the proposed mechanisms, allowing users to
refrain from bidding according to certain rules, which can
improve the overall long-term system performance.
Our key contributions are summarized as follows:
1Dimension x is preferentially dependent of dimension y if the preference
of x depends on the preference of y [17].
3TABLE I
MULTI-USER MODELS IN ADAPTIVE BITRATE STREAMING
Reference Framework Type Model Method DemoMulti-Server Multi-Video Multi-Seg per Allocation Bitrate Adaptation Incentive
[6] Device-to-Device
√ × √ × × √
[7], [8] Device-to-Device × × × × √ ×
[9], [10] Peer-to-Peer
√ × √ √ × √
[11] Peer-to-Peer
√ × √ × √ ×
[13]–[15] Bandwidth Aggregation × × √ × √ √
[4] Crowdsourced
√ √ × √ × ×
This Paper Crowdsourced
√ √ √ √ √ √
• Auction-Based Incentive Mechanisms in the CMS system:
We propose multi-dimensional auction based incentive
mechanisms for the CMS system, supporting the asyn-
chronous downloading and bitrate adapting of video
users. The design of such mechanisms is challenging,
as it needs to ensure that users truthfully report multi-
dimensional preferentially dependent information.
• Truthful and Efficient Auction: For single-segment al-
location, we propose a SOMD framework, based on
which we propose a truthful and efficient mechanism that
maximizes the social welfare in each auction. For multi-
segment allocation, we propose an MOMD framework,
based on which we propose the first mechanism achieving
both truthfulness and efficiency in a multi-object multi-
dimensional auction.
• Modified Mechanism: To enhance the long-term social
welfare of video streaming services, we further improve
the proposed mechanisms by allowing bidders to re-
frain from bidding according to their current situations.
The simulation results show that such modification can
successfully decrease rebuffer and bitrate degradation
frequency along the entire video streaming.
• Real-world Demonstration System: We construct a demo
system using Raspberry PI (a series of single-board
computers) that enables the cooperation among multiple
users watching multiple videos. Using the demo, we
further analyze the real-world performances of the CMS.
• Experiments and Performances: Based on the modified
auction mechanism, we perform experiments in both sim-
ulative system and demo system. Simulations with real
traces show that crowdsourced mobile streaming outper-
forms noncooperative streaming by 48.6% (on average) in
social welfare. Experiments over the demo system further
show that those users who help others and those users
who receive helps can increase their welfares by 15.5%
and 35.4% (on average) via cooperation, respectively.
The rest of this paper is as follows. We review related works
in Section II. We describe the system model in Section III,
and propose incentive mechanisms in Sections IV and V. We
further propose a modified mechanism in VI. Then, in Section
VII, we describe a demo system. In Section VIII, we show
experiment results. In Section IX, we conclude this work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Adaptive Bitrate Streaming
Most of early studies on ABR focused on single-user bitrate
adaptation methods, such as buffer-based adaptation [19], [20],
bandwidth-based adaptation [21], and hybrid buffer-bandwidth
adaptation [22]–[24].
To better utilize the network resources, some recent works
studied multi-user streaming models, which can be divided
into four types [25]: D2D models [6]–[8], where users share
their downloaded video segments with other users through
D2D links; P2P models [9]–[11], where users download video
segments from other users who have already downloaded it
through the Internet; BA models [13]–[15], where multiple
users aggregate their bandwidth to serve one user’s video
streaming need; CMS system [4], where multiple video users
(who may watch different videos) form groups to share their
cellular resources to serve all users’ video streaming needs.
We summarize the key features of these works in Table I.
Specifically, from the model’s perspective, we compare two
features: multi-server, “
√
” if videos can be downloaded from
multiple servers (users with downloaded videos can also be
regarded as servers); multi-video, “
√
” if users watch different
videos. From the method’s perspective, we compare three
features: multi-seg per allocation, “
√
” if multiple segments
can be allocated in an allocation; bitrate adaptation, “
√
” if
bitrate adaptation is considered; incentive, “
√
” if incentive
mechanism is considered. We also compare whether the stud-
ies involve real demonstration system or not.
In our earlier work [4], we proposed a CMS system and
derived the corresponding offline optimization problem. How-
ever, in practice, a properly designed incentive mechanism is
always required to motivate user cooperation, as cooperations
might lead to additional costs. This motivates the study of
incentive mechanism in this work.
B. Multi-Dimensional Auction
A multi-dimensional auction enables bidders to reveal multi-
dimensional information regarding the auctioned goods, such
as price and quality. Che proposed a multi-dimensional auction
framework [16], based on which Asker et al. in [26] and David
et al. in [27] studied auction properties under specific score
functions. As the multi-dimensional auction generalizes the
single-dimensional auction, it has found wide applications in
financial markets [28] and power procurement [29].
Most of the existing works on the multi-dimensional auction
considered single-object allocation, where only one good is
4allocated in each auction. In [18], Bichler et al. showed that the
multi-object extension in multi-dimensional auction is difficult
because of the preferential dependence: bidders’ preferences
of the price depend on their preferences of the quantity.
Specifically, with the preferential dependence, the widely used
score function in the additive form (as in Definitions 1 and 3)
fails to characterize the relationship between the price and the
quality dimensions. If the score function is non-additive, the
auction will be quite challenging to analyze. In [18], the au-
thors proposed a continuous auction mechanism in the multi-
object case, without the guarantee of either truthful bidding
or efficient resource allocation. In addition, the continuous
auction is unsuitable for video streaming applications, because
such an auction incurs a large signaling overhead in practice as
bidders have to submit bids repeatedly to reach an agreement.
In this work, instead of capturing all three dimensions (i.e.,
price, bitrate, and quantity) in the score function, we only
capture price and bitrate dimensions using an additive form.
We address the quantity dimension by enabling each bidder
to submit a set of two-dimensional bids (bitrate and quality
dimensions), each of which corresponds to the bid under a
particular segment number (quantity dimension). This repre-
sents a new approach of the multi-object multi-dimensional
auction design. As far as we know, this is the first work that
achieves truthful bidding and efficient resource allocation in a
multi-object multi-dimensional auction.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In a CMS system, we consider a set of mobile users N ,
{1, 2, ..., N}, who download videos cooperatively. Each user
watches a video that is encoded based on the ABR technology
and is downloaded via cellular links to his mobile device.
A. Adaptive Bitrate Streaming
We consider a typical ABR streaming protocol [5] in the
CMS system. Its key features are summarized as follows.
Video Segmentation: A source video is partitioned into a
sequence of small segments, each of which contains a piece of
the source video with a fixed playback time (e.g., 10 seconds).
Multi-Bitrate Encoding: A segment is encoded in multiple
copies with different bitrates, so that a user can select the most
suitable bitrate for each segment. Such a bitrate selection can
be based on many factors, such as real time network conditions
and individual preferences.
Data Buffering: To smooth the playback, each downloaded
segment is saved in a buffer at the user’s device before playing.
The video player on the user’s device fetches segments from
the buffer sequentially for playback. Due to the device’s
storage limit, the buffer has a limited maximum size.
For a user n, let βn > 0 denote his video’s fixed segment
length (in terms of playback time), letRn , {R1n, R2n, ..., RZn }
denote the corresponding finite bitrate set, and let Bn > 0
denote his maximum buffer size (in terms of playback time).
B. Crowdsourced Mobile Streaming
In the CMS system, users who are close-by form a mesh
network and share their network resources. Through a proper
scheduling mechanism, the group of users cooperatively down-
load the requested segments of the entire group through cel-
lular links and then forward segments to the actual requesting
users (receivers) through WiFi Direct links. Different users can
watch different videos in this framework.
We consider a continuous time model over a period of time
T , [0, T ], where t = 0 is the initial time and t = T
is the ending time. Let hn(t) > 0 denote user n’s cellular
link capacity at time t ∈ T . Let en,m(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote
the encounter between users n and user m at time t, i.e.,
en,m(t) = 1 if user n and user m are encountered. Note that
a user always encounters himself, i.e., en,n = 1 for all n.
C. User Model
We first describe the welfare generated through the down-
loading operation between two users. Then, we define the
social welfare of the system, which is the sum of the welfare
generated by all downloading operations.
In the downloading operation between two users, a user n ∈
N downloads a sequence of a total of κ segments with bitrates
r = {r1, r2, ..., rκ} for a user m ∈ N , where ri > 0 for all i.
User n and user m can be the same user. The downloading of
segment i starts at ti and ends at τi. The downloading timings
and the channel condition satisfy the following relationship:∫ τi
ti
hn(t)dt = ri · βm, i = 1, 2, ..., κ, (1)
where the total downloaded volume within the downloading
time is equal to the size of the downloaded segment.
This downloading operation (by user n for user m) induces
a cost for user n and a utility for user m.
1) Cost of Downloader (User n): Cost of the downloader is
user n’s cost for downloading and transmitting video segments
with bitrates r = {r1, r2, ..., rκ}. The cost function Cn,t(r)
consists of the cost on cellular links and the cost on WiFi
Direct links: the cellular cost is the cost for downloading the
segments (e.g., energy consumption or cellular data payment),
while the WiFi Direct cost is the cost that user n transmits the
segments to user m if n 6= m (e.g., energy consumption). Let
cn,t(r) be the cellular and the WiFi Direct cost for a single
segment with bitrate r. We assume that the cost cn,t(r) is a
non-decreasing linear function, i.e., cn,t(0) = 0, [cn,t(r)]r ≥
0, and [cn,t(r)]rr = 0.2 The linear model for downloading
and transmission energies has been widely considered in the
existing works on video services and user-provided networks
[30], [31], and the linear data payment is essentially a usage-
based model commonly adopted by mobile network operators
today. Relaxing the linearity assumption will not affect the
auction mechanism and its corresponding properties, but will
affect the particular form of the sufficient condition to satisify
Assumption 1 (Proposition 5). We assume that the cost of
different segments are independent of each other, so the cost
Cn,t(r) can be represented as follows:
2Let [·]x and [·]xx denote the first and the second order derivatives with
respect to variable x, respectively. Let [·]xy denote the second-order partial
derivative with respect to variable x and variable y.
5Cn,t(r) =
κ∑
i=1
cn,t(ri). (2)
2) Utility of Receiver (User m): Utility of the receiver is
user m’s utility for receiving κ video segments with bitrates
r = {r1, r2, ..., rκ}. A user often desires to watch a high
quality video without frequent video freezings (i.e., rebuffers)
or quality degradations [22]–[24]. Hence, the utility depends
on three factors: the video quality gain, the buffer filling gain,
and the quality degradation loss. The buffer filling gain can
be used to predict the rebuffering probability, since whether
the exact rebuffering will occur or not is unknown when users
make downloading decisions. Similar as in [32], we consider
the quality degradation loss instead of the quality switching
loss (that considers both the degradation and the upgrade
losses), as humans are more sensitive to the degradation [33].
The utility function Um,t(r) is related to the receiver m’s
desire for a high quality video θm,t, his current buffer level
BCURm,t , and his previous segment bitrate R
PRE
m,t. Formally,
Um,t(r) , V Q(r, θm,t) + V B(κ,BCURm,t)− LQD(r, RPREm,t), (3)
where the summation form of (3) is commonly used in existing
ABR works, such as [24].
a) Video Quality Gain V Q(r, θm,t) is the user’s gain in
terms of the video segment quality. A user has a higher gain
if he receives a segment with a higher bitrate. The user-
dependent factor θm,t reflects user m’s desire for a high quality
video. Let vQm(r, θm,t) be the video quality gain function for
a single segment with bitrate r, and this gain function is
non-decreasing and concave [34], i.e., [vQm(r, θm,t)]r ≥ 0 and
[vQm(r, θm,t)]rr ≤ 0. The quality gain is zero when the segment
bitrate is zero (receives nothing), i.e., vQm(0, θm,t) = 0, for any
θm,t. Moreover, a user with a higher θm,t has a higher desire
to increase the bitrate, so [vQm(r, θm,t)]r is non-decreasing in
θm,t, i.e., [vQm(r, θm,t)]rθ ≥ 0. Suppose that the quality gain
of each segment is independent of that of the others, i.e.,
V Qm(r, θm,t) =
κ∑
i=1
vQm(ri, θm,t). (4)
b) Buffer filling gain V B(κ,BCURm,t) is the user’s gain in terms
of filling the playback buffer [19], which is a gain related to
the segment number κ only. A user will have a higher gain if
he receives more segments in an allocation, as this leads to a
reduced chance of video freezing. The gain of each additional
segment decreases in the number of segments. This is because
if a user has already been allocated a larger number of
segments, he is less willing to obtain an additional one due to
the reduced probability of rebuffering. For a user with a lower
current buffer size, he is more willing to have new segments,
so he will have a higher buffer filling gain for the allocated
segments. Let BCURm,t denote user m’s real-time buffer level
at time t, which is measured in terms of the playback time.
For notation convenience, we define a buffer filling gain gap
between total κ+1 segments and total κ segments under buffer
level BCURm,t , as ∆(κ,B
CUR
m,t) = V
B
m(κ+1, B
CUR
m,t)−V Bm(κ,BCURm,t).
Summarizing the above discussions, the function V Bm(κ,B
CUR
m,t)
satisfies the following inequalities:
[V Bm(κ,B
CUR
m,t)]BCURm,t ≤ 0, (5)
∆(κ,BCURm,t) ≥ 0, ∆(κ+ 1, BCURm,t)−∆(κ,BCURm,t) < 0. (6)
c) Quality Degradation Loss LQD(r, RPREm,t) is the user’s loss
when the video degrades from a higher bitrate to a lower
bitrate. The user will have a higher degradation loss if the
degradation gap is larger. Let lQDm (rˆ, r) be the degradation loss
due to the fact that a newly downloaded segment degrades
from the previous bitrate rˆ (of the previous segment) to the
current bitrate r with the gap ∆r = rˆ − r:
lQDm (rˆ, r) =
{
0, rˆ < r,
l˜QDm (∆r), otherwise.
(7)
The positive part l˜QDm (∆r) linearly increases with ∆r [24], i.e.,
[l˜QDm (∆r)]∆r ≥ 0, [l˜QDm (∆r)]∆r∆r = 0. (8)
Let r0 = RPREm,t be the bitrate of the segment that user m
receives immediately before the new downloading segments.
The loss LQDm (r, R
PRE
m,t) of the segments with bitrates r is the
sum of the degradation loss of all the segments. Formally,
LQDm (r, R
PRE
m,t) =
κ∑
i=1
lQDm (ri−1, ri). (9)
3) Social Welfare: In the downloading operation by user n
for user m, the generated welfare is defined as the difference
between the user m’s utility and the user n’s cost:
Wnm,t(r) = Um,t(r)− Cn,t(r). (10)
The social welfare of the system is the sum of the welfares
that are generated through all the downloading operations
among all the users.
D. Problem Formulation
We aim to design an incentive mechanism in the CMS sys-
tem that can reveal user’s private information and maximizes
the social welfare. The mechanism should help each user to
decide how to allocate the downloading opportunities of K
segments to near-by users: (i) who is the receiver of each of
the segments, (ii) what is the bitrate of each of the segments,
and (iii) what is the payment of each of the segment receivers?
We will design auction mechanisms to address the issue
of user private information. More specifically, we propose a
single-object (K = 1) and a multi-object (K ≥ 1) auction-
based mechanism in Section IV and Section V, respectively.
IV. SINGLE-OBJECT AUCTION-BASED MECHANISM
We adopt an auction-based incentive mechanism, in which
users allocate segment downloading opportunities using auc-
tions. At each decision epoch of any user (who is ready to
download segments), he acts as an auctioneer and initiates an
auction for all nearby users for deciding the next K segments
(K = 1 in this section) to be downloaded. This framework
operates in an asynchronous and decentralized manner, in the
sense that each user initiates an auction independently and
6asynchronously from other users. To clarify, a double auction
(that involves multiple auctioneers in an auction) is not suitable
for the CMS system. This is because if implementing a double
auction, under the auctioneers’ asynchronous downloading
operations, the auctioneers who are ready for downloading
earlier have to wait for those who are ready later, which can
lead to a significant downloading resource waste.
We propose a multi-dimensional auction based framework,
in which the bidders reveal their intended bitrates and intended
prices through submitting multi-dimensional bids on the K
segments to be downloaded. Without loss of generality, we
consider an auction initiated by a downloader (auctioneer)
n to his encountered users. We assume that the auction
period (including the auction operation period and the seg-
ment downloading period) is short enough, so that user n’s
encountered users do not change during the auction period.
Such an assumption is supported by the fact that a segment
often has a small size (e.g., 10 seconds), and the corresponding
total downloading and device-to-device transmission time is
relatively small (comparing with the user’s mobility time
scale). Let Nn denote the set of user n’s encountered users:
Nn , {m ∈ N | en,m(t) = 1, t ∈ [t0, t0 + ]}, (11)
where [t0, t0 + ] is the auction period. Let |Nn| denote the
total number of users in set Nn. Note that the downloader will
also join the auction as a virtual bidder (i.e., en,n(t) = 1) to
fulfill his own service requirement. The bidder m’s private
information is his real-time utility function, i.e., Um,t(·),
depending on his desire for high quality video θm,t, current
buffer level BCURm,t , and previous segment bitrate R
PRE
m,t (Section
III-C2). We also assume that these functions and parameters
do not change during a single auction.
In this section, we focus on single-object multi-dimensional
auction mechanism design, where the auctioneer allocates one
segment in each auction, i.e., K = 1.
A. Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism
1) SOMD Auction Framework: In the SOMD auction
framework, each bidder submits a two-dimensional bid com-
prising bitrate and price. According to the bids, the auctioneer
allocates the single segment to a single winner. Formally,
Framework 1 (SOMD Auction Framework).
1) The auctioneer n announces auction rules, including the
allocation rule Γ(·) and the payment rule Π(·);
2) Each bidder m ∈ Nn submits a bid bm = (rm, pm) to
maximize his own expected payoff. Let b = (bm,∀m ∈
Nn) denote the bids from all the bidders;
3) The auctioneer n determines the winner σ† and the
winner’s payment pi† according to the announced rules:
σ† = Γ(b), pi† = Π(b). (12)
The auctioneer will download a segment for winner σ†
at the bitrate specified in the winner’s bid, i.e, r† = rσ
†
.
Here, pi† is the actual payment from the winner, which may
not be equal to the price pσ
†
submitted by the winner. Given
an auction outcome (σ†, pi†, r†), the auctioneer n’s payoff is
Pn(pi
†, r†) = pi† − Cn,t(r†), (13)
and the receiver (winner) σ†’s payoff is
Pσ†(pi
†, r†) = Uσ†,t(r
†)− pi†, (14)
where Cn,t(·) is the downloader’s cost defined in (2), and
Uσ†,t(·) is the receiver’s utility defined in (3).
2) Second-Score Auction: The winning rule Γ(·) and the
payment rule Π(·) are two key elements in auction design. In
a single-dimensional auction, the auctioneer can determine the
winner by simply sorting all bidders’ prices and choosing the
bidder with the highest price. In a multi-dimensional auction
here, however, the auctioneer cannot determine the winner
by simply choosing the bidder with the highest price. This
is because the bitrate of bidder will affect the auctioneer’s
downloading cost, and hence the auctioneer’s payoff.
To this end, we introduce a score function to determine the
winner and the payment. The key idea is to transform a multi-
dimensional bid (r, p) into a single-dimensional score φ(r, p),
so that the auctioneer can sort bidders according to their scores
and determine the winner by choosing the highest score bidder.
In this work, we adopt the class of score functions in [27].
Definition 1 (Single-Object Score Function). Given the bitrate
rm and the price pm submitted by a bidder m, the single-
object score function is defined as
φ(rm, pm) = pm − s(rm), (15)
where s(·) is a non-decreasing function with s(0) = 0.
Intuitively, such a score function increases with the bidder’s
price and decreases with the bidder’s bitrate, capturing the fact
that the auctioneer prefers a higher price and a lower bitrate.
Note that (15) corresponds to a class of score functions, as
we have not specified the concrete form of function s(·).
A key contribution of our work is to design the function
s(·) properly in order to achieve desirable outcomes such as
efficiency (social welfare maximization).
We implement a second-score (multi-dimensional) auction
[16], where the winner is the bidder with the highest score,
and the winner’s payment is the price that “derives” the second
highest score under the winner’s bitrate. Formally,
Mechanism 1 (Second-Score Auction). The second-score
auction is a special case of Framework 1, where the allocation
and bidding rules are defined as follows:
1) Allocation Rule: The winner σ† is the bidder with the
highest score, i.e.,
σ† = arg max
m∈Nn
φ(rm, pm); (16)
2) Payment Rule: The winner’s payment pi† is the price
that derives the second highest score under his bitrate
r† = rσ
†
, i.e.,
pi† − s(r†) = max
m∈Nn/σ†
φ(rm, pm). (17)
Next, we first analyze any bidder’s optimal price and bitrate
strategies in Section IV-B. Based on the optimal strategies, we
propose an efficient mechanism through a proper choice of
score function in Section IV-C.
7B. Truthfulness and Optimal Bitrate
In the second-score auction, we will show that each bidder
will submit his bid (i.e., price and bitrate) according to
Proposition 1 and 2 to maximize his expected payoff, with
proofs in Appendix A and B, respectively.
Proposition 1 (Truthfulness). Given any bitrate bidding strat-
egy rm, the optimal price bidding strategy pm of a bidder m
is his true utility under the selected bitrate rm, i.e.,
pm = Um,t(r
m). (18)
Proposition 2 (Optimal Bitrate). The optimal bitrate bidding
strategy rm of a bidder m is given by
rm = arg max
r∈Rm
(Um,t(r)− s(r)) . (19)
Propositions 1 and 2 propose the optimal strategy of each
bidder m in the second-score auction. To maximize his own
profit, each bidder should select the bitrate r that maximizes
the difference between his utility Um,t(r) and the s(r), and
select the price p that is equal to his utility under the optimized
bitrate. Due to the finite choices of bitrate, an optimal solution
always exists, and each bidder is able to calculate the optimal
solution based on his local information and the auctioneer’s
announced information with a low computation complexity.
C. Efficiency
Notice that Propositions 1 and 2 hold for any score functions
in the form of (15). On the other hand, the specific choice
of s(r) determines bidders’ optimal strategies and auction’s
allocation and payment, so auctioneers can choose the score
function to achieve desirable auction outcomes.
Here, we propose the efficient mechanism that maximizes
the social welfare. We first define an efficient score function:
Definition 2 (Single-Object Efficient Score Function). An
efficient score function is in the form of
φ(r, p) = p− Cn,t(r), (20)
where Cn,t(r) is the auctioneer’s downloading cost.
Under the score function of (20), we next show that the
second-score auction implements the efficient mechanism.
Theorem 1 (Efficiency). Under the optimal bidding behavior
specified in Propositions 1 and 2, the second-score auction
with the efficient score function in (20) implements the efficient
mechanism that maximizes the social welfare.
Proof. Based on Proposition 1 and 2, each bidder m submits
bid (rm, pm), where rm = arg maxr∈Rm (Um,t(r)− Cn(r))
and pm = Um,t(rm). In other words, each bidder submits the
bitrate rm that maximizes his score. This leads to
φ(rm, pm) = max
r∈Rm
(Um,t(r)− Cn(r)) . (21)
In second-score auction, the winner σ† is the bidder with the
highest score, i.e.,
σ† = arg max
m∈Nn
φ(rm, pm). (22)
The winning bitrate r† is the bitrate submitted by the winner
σ†, i.e., r† = rσ
†
= arg maxr∈R
σ†
(
Uσ†,t(r)− Cn(r)
)
.
Hence, the social welfare under σ† and r† is as follows:
Uσ†,t(r
†)− Cn(r†) = max
m∈Nn
max
r∈Rm
(Um,t(r)− Cn(r)) , (23)
which implies that the social welfare is maximized.
Note that the exact downloading capacity is unknown be-
forehand, which leads to an unknown cost function Cn,t(r)
in (20) when an auctioneer initiates an auction. Hence, in
practice, an auctioneer needs to estimate his downloading
capacity based on his historical information using methods
such as the one in [21]. The design and optimization of
such an estimation is outside the scope of this paper. In
later simulations, we assume that an auctioneer calculates his
cost function based on the average capacities of his previ-
ous several downloading operations. Although the estimation
accuracy will affect the mechanism performance, bidders and
auctioneers make decisions based on not only the cost Cn,t(r)
but also bidders’ utilities Um,t(r) (which involves bidders’
buffer level information). Hence, under the extreme case where
capacities vary dramatically, the consideration of the buffer
levels can alleviate the performance degradation caused by
inaccurate estimation.
V. MULTI-OBJECT AUCTION-BASED MECHANISM
To reduce the possibly excessive signaling overhead caused
by the frequently auctions, in this section, we consider the
more general case of multi-object multi-dimensional auction
mechanism design, where the auctioneer allocates multiple
segments in each auction, i.e., K ≥ 1. For nontation simplicity,
we will write the bidder set Nn as M = {1, 2, ...,M}, where
M is the total number of bidders in the set Nn.
A. Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism
1) MOMD Auction Framework: In the MOMD auction
framework, bidders submit multi-dimensional bids, revealing
their intended bitrate and price under each segment that
might be allocated. Based on the bids, the auctioneer allocates
the (downloading opportunities of) K segments to multiple
bidders. An MOMD auction operates as follows:
Framework 2. [MOMD Auction Framework]
1) The auctioneer n announces auction rules, including the
segment number K, the allocation rule Γ(·), and the
payment rule Π(·);
2) Each bidder m ∈M submits a bid bm = (Rm,pm) to
maximize his own expected payoff. Let b = (bm,∀m ∈
M) denote the bids from all the bidders. Here,
• Bitrate matrix
Rm =

rm1
rm2
...
rmK
 =

rm11 0 ... 0
rm21 r
m
22 ... 0
...
...
. . .
...
rmK1 r
m
K2 ... r
m
KK
 ,
(24)
where rmκi ∈ Rm is the bitrate of the ith segment
when bidder m is allocated a total of κ segments.
8• Price Vector
pm = (pm1 , p
m
2 , ..., p
m
K) , (25)
where pmκ is the total price (willingness-to-pay)
when bidder m is allocated a total of κ segments.
3) The auctioneer n determines the allocation set, i.e., the
winner of each segment, σ† , {σ†1, σ†2, ..., σ†K}, and the
payment set, i.e., the price that each bidder needs to pay,
pi† , {pi†1, pi†2, ..., pi†M}, according to the rules:
σ† = Γ(b), pi† = Π(b). (26)
Accordingly, the downloading bitrate of each segment
is equal to the submitted bitrate of the corresponding
winner, denoted by r† , {r†1, r†2, ..., r†K}.
Notice that both the allocation set and the bitrate set have
the size of K, as these two sets enumerate the receiver and
the bitrate for each segment, respectively; however, the size
of the payment set is M , and each element corresponds to
the payment from a bidder. To facilitate the later discussions,
we define a revised allocation set σ‡ and a revised bitrate
set r‡, both of which have the size of M . More specifically,
starting from allocation set σ†, we can compute the number of
segments allocated to bidder m, denoted as κ˜m. With this we
can define the revised allocation set as σ‡ = {κ˜1, κ˜2, ..., κ˜M},
where
∑M
m=1 κ˜m = K. Similarly, we define the revised bitrate
set as r‡ = {r˜1, r˜2, ..., r˜M}, where vector r˜m is the bitrate
set for the κ˜m segments allocated to bidder m, i.e., r˜m = rmκ˜m
(i.e., the κ˜mth row of bitrate bid matrix Rm).
Based on the auction results, the auctioneer n’s payoff is
the sum of the difference between each bidder’s payment and
n’s downloading cost for this bidder’s segments, i.e.,
Pn(pi
†, r‡) =
M∑
m=1
[pi†m − Cn,t(r˜m)]. (27)
Bidder m’s payoff is the difference between his utility and his
payment, i.e.,
Pm(pi
†
m, r˜m) = Um,t(r˜m)− pi†m. (28)
2) Vickrey-Score Auction: In a multi-dimensional auction,
the vector bids may not be sorted easily, and this introduces
difficulties for determining the allocation set and the payment
set. We again introduce a score function to address this
problem. Different from single-object case in Section IV, here
we will transform the bids into sequences of marginal scores,
of which the auctioneer can sort and make decisions.
We first define the score function as follows.
Definition 3 (Multi-Object Score Function). Given the bitrate
Rm and the price pm submitted by a bidder m, for any num-
ber of allocated segments κ, the multi-object score function
φ(rmκ , p
m
κ ) is given by
φ(rmκ , p
m
κ ) = p
m
κ − s(rmκ ), (29)
where s(·) is a component-wise non-decreasing function and
s(0) = 0.
The score function in (29) involves one row in the bitrate
matrix in (24) and one component in the price vector in
(25). Hence, for each bidder m, we will compute K scores,
i.e., φ(rκ, pκ),∀κ = 1, ...,K. Based on this, we can further
compute the marginal score sequence for each bidder m:
Sm = {Sm1 , Sm2 , ...SmK}, where the κth marginal score reflects
bidder m’s score increase when the total allocated segment
number to bidder m increases from κ− 1 to κ. Formally,
Smκ =
{
φ(rm1 , p
m
1 ), κ = 1,
φ(rmκ , p
m
κ )− φ(rmκ−1, pmκ−1), 2 ≤ κ ≤ K. (30)
We impose the following assumption on marginal scores:
Assumption 1 (Marginal Score). For any bidder m ∈ M,
the marginal score sequence Sm is non-negative and non-
increasing in κ, where:
Smκ ≥ Smκ+1 ≥ 0, κ = 1, 2, ...,K − 1. (31)
Assumption 1 implies that an additional segment induces a
larger score (i.e., a positive marginal score Smκ+1 ≥ 0), and
the score increase (i.e., the marginal score) is non-increasing
with the allocated segment number κ (i.e., Smκ ≥ Smκ+1). In
Section V-D, we provide a sufficient condition under which
Assumption 1 is always satisfied.
Inspired by the VCG mechanism [35], we propose a
Vickrey-score auction, where we allocate the K segments
to the K highest marginal scores, and choose the payments
reflecting the score damages of the winners to the system.
Next we will first define the proposed mechanism, and then
provide a numerical illustrating example.
For a bidder m, let sequence Sˆ−m denote the K highest
marginal scores except bidder m’s:
Sˆ−m , {Sˆ−m1 , Sˆ−m2 , ..., Sˆ−mK }, (32)
where Sˆ−mk is the k
th highest value among all the bidders’
marginal scores except bidder m’s. We further let S† denote
the K highest marginal scores among all bidders:
S† , {S†1, S†2, ..., S†K}, (33)
where S†k is the k
th highest value among all the bidders’
marginal scores. The Vickrey-score auction is as follows:
Mechanism 2 (Vickrey-Score Auction). The Vickrey-score
auction is a special case of Framework 2, where the allocation
and payment rules are defined as follows:
• Allocation Rule: The segment k’s receiver σ†k is the bidder
corresponding to the kth highest marginal score, i.e.,
S
σ†k
i = S
†
k, (34)
where Sσ
†
k
i refers to the i
th marginal score of bidder σ†k.
• Payment Rule: If bidder m wins κ˜m segments, then his
payment pi†m corresponds to the score damage caused by
this bidder under his submitted bitrate, i.e.,
pi†m − s(rmκ˜m) =
κ˜m∑
i=1
Sˆ−mK−κ˜m+i. (35)
Example 1. Consider an auction with M = 3 users and
K = 4 segments, where we have the following marginal score
9sequences: S1 = {8, 7, 5, 2}, S2 = {9, 6, 3, 2}, and
S3 = {4, 4, 3, 1}. Hence, we have the sorted sequences:
S† = {9, 8, 7, 6}; Sˆ−1 = {9, 6, 4, 4};
Sˆ−2 = {8, 7, 5, 4}; Sˆ−3 = {9, 8, 7, 6}.
The four numbers in vector S† corresponds to the marginal
scores of user 1 (8 and 7) and user 2 (9 and 6). Hence,
according to the proposed Vickrey-score auction: user 1 wins
two segments, and user 2 wins two segments. The payments
of user 1 and user 2 are:
pi†1 =
2∑
i=1
Sˆ−14−2+i + s(r
1
2) = 4 + 4︸ ︷︷ ︸
score damage
+s(r12);
pi†2 =
2∑
i=1
Sˆ−24−2+i + s(r
2
2) = 5 + 4︸ ︷︷ ︸
score damage
+s(r22).
Take user 1 as an example: without user 1, user 3 will win 2
segments with scores 4 and 4, so these scores are the score
damage caused by user 1. Hence, user 1 has to pay the price
that compensates this damage as shown above.
B. Truthfulness and Optimal Bitrate
In the Vickrey-score auction, we prove that each bidder will
submit his bid (i.e., price and bitrate) according to Proposition
3 and Proposition 4 to maximize his expected payoff, with
proofs in Appendix C and D, respectively.
Proposition 3 (Truthfulness). Given any bitrate matrix Rm,
the optimal price vector pm of a bidder m is his true utility
under the selected bitrate matrix Rm, i.e.,
pmκ = Um,t(r
m
κ ), κ = 1, 2, ...,K. (36)
Proposition 4 (Optimal Bitrate). For any number of allocated
segments κ to bidder m, the optimal bitrate vector rmκ is the
optimal solution r? of the following optimization problem:
maximize
r
Um,t(r)− s(r)
subject to ri > 0, i = 1, ..., κ,
ri = 0, i = κ+ 1, ...,K,
variables ri ∈ Rm, i = 1, ..., κ.
(37)
The constraints restrict the allocated segment number to be κ.
C. Efficiency
In this section, we propose the efficient score function that
maximizes the social welfare.
Definition 4 (Multi-Object Efficient Score Function). An
efficient score function is in the form of
φ(r, p) = p− Cn,t(r), (38)
where Cn,t(r) is the downloading cost of the auctioneer.
If each bidder submits the bid based on the optimal price
in Proposition 3 and the optimal bitrate in Proposition 4, we
prove that the Vickrey-score auction with the efficient score
function maximizes the social welfare.
Theorem 2 (Efficiency). Under the optimal bidding behavior
specified in Propositions 3 and 4, the Vickrey-score auction
with the efficient score function in (38) implements the efficient
mechanism that maximizes the social welfare.
Proof. In the Vickrey-score auction with an efficient score
function, when bidding according to Proposition 3 and 4, any
bidder m’s bid will induce a score φm,nκ for being allocated κ
segments, i.e., φm,nκ = maxrκ (Um,t(rκ)− Cn,t(rκ)), where
rκ denotes the bitrate vector that satisfies the constraint of
κ segments. Here, φm,nκ is essentially the maximum welfare
that can be generated through the downloading by auctioneer
n for bidder m under a particular segment number κ. Let
σ = {κ1, κ2, ..., κM} denote an allocation set, where κm is
the number of segments allocated to bidder m. In the Vickrey-
score auction, the auctioneer chooses the allocation set σ∗ =
arg maxσ
∑M
m=1 φ
m
κm , i.e., picking the set of allocation that
maximizes the welfare generated between aunctioneer n and
bidders, that is, the social welfare.
Finally, we comment on the applicability of the proposed
Vickrey-score auction in existing video streaming systems,
where the bitrate adaptation method has been specified. In
this case, if each bidder chooses the bidding price according
to Proposition 3 and use an existing bitrate adaptation method
(e.g. [19]–[24]), the Vickrey-score auction with the efficient
score function is conditionally efficient.
Corollary 1 (Conditional efficiency). Given any fixed bitrate
Rm for bidder m, Vickrey-score auction with the efficient score
function maximizes the social welfare under the fixed bitrates.
The proof of Corollary 1 is similar as the proof of Theorem
2 and hence is omitted.
D. Conditions for Satisfying Assumption 1
By now we have proved several desirable properties of the
Vickrey-score auction under Assumption 1. In this section, we
will specify sufficient conditions, under which Assumption 1
is satisfied. As an example, we will focus on the efficient score
function in (38) in the rest of the discussions. Our discussions
can also be generalized to other choices of score functions.
The rest of this subsection is divided into two parts. First, we
prove some additional properties of a bidder’s optimal bitrate
matrix. Next, we characterize sufficient conditions of the cost
function Cn,t(·) and the utility function Um,t(·) (defined in
III-C) in Proposition 5, under which Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Starting from Proposition 4, we prove that a bidder’s optimal
bitrate matrix has two features, as shown in Lemma 1 and 2.
Note that both lemmas are based on the efficient score function
in (38), where the optimal bitrate vector in each row κ is given:
rmκ = arg max
rκ
(Um,t(rκ)− Cn,t(rκ)) . (39)
Here, rκ = {rκ1, rκ2, ..., rκκ} denotes the vector with κ
non-zero elements, and Um,t(rκ) = V Qm,t(rκ) + V
B
m,t(κ) −
LQDm,t(rκ, R
PRE
m,t). For presentation convenience, we define a
function gmn,t(r) = vQm,t(r) − cn,t(r). Since the value of
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m,t) depends on segment number κ but not the value
of rκ, the optimal vector rκ can also be represented as:
rmκ = arg max
rκ
(
κ∑
i=1
gmn,t(rκi)− LQDm,t(rκ, RPREm,t)
)
. (40)
Any bidder’s optimal bitrate matrix has the following features:
Lemma 1 (Identical Bitrate). Under the efficient score func-
tion in (38), any bidder m’s optimal bitrate matrix Rm satis-
fies that in any row κ, the non-zero bitrate elements rmκi (i ≤ κ)
are identical, hence can be written as rmκi = r
m
κ , ∀i ≤ κ.
The detailed proof is given in Appendix E, and here are the
intuitions. First, in (40), the order of the non-zero elements
in vector rmκ only affects function L
QD
m,t(r, R
PRE
m,t), which is
minimized when the elements are in the ascending order.
Hence, the non-zero elements in the optimal vector rmκ has be
in the ascending order. This means that the bitrate degradation
may only happen at the first segment, i.e.,
rmκ = arg max
rκ
(
κ∑
i=1
gmn,t(rκi)− lQD(RPREm,t, rκ1)
)
. (41)
Second, there always exists an optimal bitrate (denoted by r∗)
that maximizes gmn,t(r). If RPREm,t ≤ r∗, then rmκi = r∗ for
all i = 1, 2, ..., κ. If RPREm,t ≥ r∗, we can obtain rmκ1 ≥ r∗
by checking the partial derivate of the objective function in
(41) with respect to rκ1. Moreover, the concave function
gmn,t(r) is non-increasing with r for r ≥ rmκ1 ≥ r∗,
so gmn,t(rmκ2), ..., gmn,t(r
m
κκ) are maximized when bitrates
rκ2, ..., rκκ are minimized under the constraint that rmκ1 ≤
rmκ2 ≤ ... ≤ rmκκ, which implies rmκ1 = rmκ2 = ... = rmκκ.
Lemma 2 (Non-Increasing Bitrate). Under the efficient score
function in (38), any bidder m’s optimal bitrate matrix Rm
satisfies that the bitrate rmκ for row κ defined in Lemma 1 is
non-increasing in the row index κ: rmκ ≥ rmκ+1 for all κ =
1, 2, ...,K − 1.
According to Lemma 1, the optimal common non-zero
bitrate rmκ for each row κ is derived as follows:
rmκ = arg max
r
(
κ · gmn,t(r)− lQD(RPREm,t, r)
)
. (42)
Intuitively, if RPREm,t ≤ r∗, rmi = r∗ for all i = 1, 2, ..., κ. If
RPREm,t ≥ r∗, as κ increases, the impact of κ · gmn,t(r) on the
optimization problem increases, so rmκ gradually decreases in
κ to approach r∗. The detailed proof is in Appendix F.
Based on Lemma 1 and 2, we show the sufficient conditions
of Cn,t(·) and Um,t(·) for satisfying Assumption 1.
Proposition 5 (Sufficient Conditions for Assumption 1). The
marginal scores are non-negative for all m,n, t, if
vQm(r, θ) ≥ cn,t(r), ∀r, θ. (43)
The marginal scores are non-increasing in κ (i.e., the number
of allocated segments) for all m,n, t, if
2K · cn,t(RZm) + lQDm (RZm, 0) ≤ |∆˜|, (44)
where ∆˜ is the minimum value that satisifies
0 > ∆˜ ≥ ∆(κ+ 1, BCURm,t)−∆(κ,BCURm,t), ∀κ,BCURm,t . (45)
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Fig. 3. The Video Streaming of Users A and B under Mechanism 2.
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Intuitively, to satisfy Assumption 1, the video quality gain of
each allocated segment should be no less than the downloading
cost of that segment to ensure the non-negative marginal
scores, and the buffer filling gain should be concave enough
(i.e., |∆˜| should be large enough) to ensure the non-increasing
marginal scores. The detailed proof is shown in Appendix G.
VI. MECHANISM MODIFICATION
In Sections IV and V, we proposed two auction-based in-
centive mechanisms for single segment and multiple segments
downloading, respectively. By implementing the efficient score
function, the mechanisms can maximize the social welfare in
each auction. However, since the social welfare maximization
is performed in each auction independently, the long-term
social welfare across multiple rounds of auctions may not
necessarily achieve the maximum in some cases.
One scenario worth considering is where the link capacities
of some users are substantially poorer than others. Hence
utilizing the downloading opportunities of these users might
actually hurt the overall performance. Figure 3 shows the video
scheduling processes of such a scenario with two users: user
A and user B. Here x-axis corresponds to the video streaming
time horizon (of 200 seconds), and y-axis corresponds to
cellular network capacity (for the gray continuous curves).
User A has an average capacity of 3Mpbs along the whole
streaming interval (200 seconds), while user B has an average
capacity of 0.3Mbps during the first 100 seconds and an
average capacity of 3Mbps during the latter 100 seconds.
The stems with circles and crosses are the segments that
are downloaded by user A and user B, respectively, and the
heights of these stems represent the corresponding segment
bitrates. Note that the cellular link capacities and the bitrates
are measured in the same unit of Mbps. Available bitrate set
is {0.2, 0.4, 0.7, 1.3, 2.3}Mbps.
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With the proposed auction mechanism, as shown in Figure
3, two unexpected results happen due to the low capacity of
user B during the first 100 seconds: i) bitrate degradation;
ii) rebuffer. For example, although user A achieves a video
bitrate of 2.3Mbps most of the time, a bitrate degradation to
0.7Mbps happens at about second 100 when user B downloads
for user A. The reason is that user B has a quite low link
capacity, so users A chooses a lower bitrate (when asking user
B to help downloading) to avoid rebuffer. Similar situation
happens when user B downloads for himself at about second
60. Moreover, as user B partially relies on the downloading by
himself during the first 100 seconds, he experiences rebuffer
at second 50. The rebuffer continues until the corresponding
segment has been downloaded at the end of second 53.
The observation in Figure 3 motivates us to modify our
proposed mechanism to increase the long-term social welfare
by avoiding unexpected bitrate degradation and rebuffer. The
basic idea is that any bidder m can “skip” the available
network downloading resources from an auctioneer n by
refraining from bidding if both of the following conditions
are satisfied: (i) the link capacity of auctioneer n is low
so that the downloading (by auctioneer n) for user m will
result in rebuffer; (ii) the link capacity of auctioneer n is
lower than the downloading capacity that allocates to user
m, which is the sum of the capacities that each of user m’s
encountered users allocates to user m (under the assumption
that user m’s encountered user i ∈ Nm equally allocates
his capacity to his encountered users Ni). Mathematically,
We introduce coefficients αLINK and αBUF to adjust bidder’s
willingness of refraining from bidding: a smaller coefficient
indicates a smaller willingness to skip the current resources.
Mechanism 3 (Modification of Bidding Participation in Mech-
anism 2). To improve the long-term social welfare, we modify
Mechanism 2 by allowing bidders to refrain from bidding if
necessary. Specifically, after an auctioneer n announces the
start of the auction with the allocation and payment rules, a
bidders should refrain from bidding if both of the following
inequalities are satisfied:
hn(t) < α
BUF · R
PRE
m,t · βm
BCURm,t
, hn(t) < α
LINK ·
∑
i∈Nm
hi(t)
|Ni| , (46)
where |Ni| denotes the total number of user i’s encountered
users. This means that only a subset of set M may choose to
partipate in the bidding process. The rest of the auction is the
same as Mechanism 2.
Notice that the values of the coefficients αBUF and αLINK
will impact on the social welfare, hence should be chosen
carefully through experimental studies. Under the experiment
setting similar as that in Figure 3, we evaluate each of the
coefficient pairs αLINK ∈ [0, 2] and αLINK ∈ [0, 2] for 1000
randomly generated link capacity scenarios, and find that
choosing αLINK = 0.5 and αBUF = 1 will lead to the largest
long-term social welfare on average in this experiment. Hence,
in our later experiments, we set αLINK = 0.5 and αBUF = 1.
After the modification, Figure 4 shows the performance
of the same two users (as in Figure 3) under the modified
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN UNMODIFIED AND MODIFIED MECHANISMS.
User B’s Average Capacity (Mbps) 0.15 0.3 0.45 1.5 3.0
Social Welfare Improvement (%) 16.9 13.2 9.6 0.0 0.0
Rebuffer Reduction (%) 1.6 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.0
Bitrate Degrade Reduction (%) 22.1 5.9 0.2 0.0 0.0
Mechanism 3, and we notice that the quality degradation and
rebuffer do not occur (under the same experiment settings).
Moreover, the modification does not have much impact on
the scheduling when both users have relatively high average
capacities (i.e., the last 100 seconds). Overall, the modification
increases the long-term average social welfare by 6.17%.
We further perform comparisons between the unmodified
Mechanism 2 and the modified Mechanism 3 over 1000
randomly generated network scenarios. In the experiments,
user A and user B watch two different 100-second videos.
The average link capacity of user A is 3Mbps, while the
average capacity of user B varies from 0.15Mbps to 3Mbps
(listed in Table II). The rest of the settings are the same as
in Figure 3 and 4. Table II shows the average results over
the 1000 experiment rounds. As shown in the table, when
user B’s capacity is low (i.e., 0.15, 0.3, and 0.45 Mbps), the
modification increases the social welfare as well as reduces
the rebuffer ratio (i.e., the ratio of the total rebuffer time to
the total video length) and the bitrate degradation ratio (i.e.,
the ratio of the bitrate degradation amount to the sum of
the bitrates of all the received video segments). As user B’s
capacity becomes large (i.e., 1.5 and 3 Mbps), the modified
and unmodfied mechanisms achieve the same performance.
This is an expected result because, when both users have high
capacities, the unmodified mechanism already has no rebuffer
and bitrate degradation and hence no need for modification.
VII. DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM
We implement the CMS system on Raspberry PI Model
B+ with the Wheezy-Raspbian operating system. In the
demonstration system, Raspberry PIs correspond to the mobile
devices, which are equipped with monitors (for video play-
ing), LTE USB modems (for LTE connections), and WLAN
adapters (for WiFi connections). The devices can dynamically
join and leave the cooperative group and there is no need
for a centralized control. After joining the cooperative group,
the mobile devices download video segments via LTE and
forward messages as well as video segments to other devices
(if needed) through WiFi connections.
Figure 5 (a) illustrates the system architecture with the
following modules. User Interface displays videos to human.
Storage & Controller stores system information and down-
loaded videos, and offers other modules necessary control
signals. Video Requester pulls video segments from servers
through LTE links, and Video Buffer fetches and stores the
segments that are for the device’s own video consumption.
Auction implements our proposed auction mechanism, mainly
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Fig. 6. Comparisons: (a) Social Welfare; (b) Average Bitrate; (c) Rebuffer;
(d) Quality Degradation.
consisting of Auctioneer and Bidder modules. When the device
acts as an auctioneer, Auctioneer module is active and is in
charge of the information announcement and auction determi-
nation. When the device acts as a bidder, Bidder module is
active and is in charge of the bid calculation and submission.
Message Dispatcher transmits and receives auction infor-
mation, such as auction announcement and bid submission,
through WiFi connections. Transmitter & Receiver transmits
the downloaded segment to others and receives the segments
downloaded by others through WiFi connections.
Figure 5 (b) shows the signaling between auctioneer’s Auc-
tioneer module and bidders’ Bidder modules. The auctioneer
first initiates the auction, then, the bidders compute and submit
their bids. Since information exchange (e.g., auction initiation
and bidding) takes time (due to message passing), we introduce
a waiting time (100ms) between the auction initiation and the
auction result determination to ensure that all the bids are
received before determining auction results. After the auction
result determination, the auctioneer announces the results to
all the bidders. The winners will send the required segment
URL to the auctioneer, and the auctioneer will download the
segments and pass to the winners accordingly.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS AND PERFORMANCE
The experiments in this section are based on the modified
multi-object auction mechanism (Mechanism 3). Note that the
multi-object mechanism includes the single-object mechanism
as a special case by letting K = 1.
A. Method Comparison
In this section, we compare our proposed auction scheme
with existing methods using real cellular link capacity traces
obtained from BesTV. We perform the comparison results
for 500 randomly generated network scenarios and show the
average results. For each network scenario, we consider 3
users whose cellular link capacities are randomly generated
based on the statistics extracted from real traces, and each user
is interested in watching a 100-second video. The available
bitrates for all three users’ videos are {0.2, 0.4, 0.7, 1.3,
2.3}Mbps, and the common segment length β = 10s.
We compare our mechanism with existing methods in two
aspects: (i) comparison among three cooperative scenarios—
noncooperation, cooperation with single-dimensional (Vick-
rey) auction [35], and cooperation with multi-dimensional
(our proposed Vickrey-score) auction; (ii) bitrate adaptation
comparison among buffer-based method (BUF-based) [20],
bandwidth-based method (BW-based) [21], hybrid buffer-
bandwidth method (Hybrid) [22], and our optimal bitrate
method (OPT). For now we do not consider the impact of
auction overhead (i.e., auction time and energy consumption),
hence it is optimal to choose K = 1 segment due to its
maximum flexibility to the users. We will consider the impact
of overhead and the proper choice of K in Section VIII-B.
Figure 6 shows the results. For comparison (i), under each
of the cooperative scenarios, we take the average among all
four methods. Compared with noncooperation, cooperation
with multi-dimensional auction increases the social welfare
by 48.6%, increases the average bitrate by 8.9%, and re-
duces the rebuffer by 73.7%. Compared with the cooperation
with single-dimensional auction, the cooperation with multi-
dimensional auction reduces the rebuffer by 61.4% (as the
multi-dimensional auction considers the bitrate adaptation) and
increases the social welfare by 3.9%. For comparison (ii),
under the scenario of the cooperation with multi-dimensional
auction, our mechanism has the highest social welfare (out-
performing the other methods by 24.8% on average), the
highest bitrate (outperforming the other methods by 25.8%
on average), a relatively low rebuffer time (0.26 second on
average for a 100-second video), and a relatively low quality
degradation (with a degradation ratio3 of 2.5% on average).
B. Auction Overhead
Now we study the impact of the auction overhead and the
proper choice of K. Auction mechanism mainly induces two
kinds of overheads: energy consumption and time consump-
tion. By increasing the segment number K per auction, both
the energy and the time spent on the auctions in a fixed video
3The quality degradation ratio is defined as the ratio of the bitrate degrada-
tion volume to the sum of the bitrates of all the received video segments. For
example, for a sequence of received segments with bitrates {1.3, 0.7, 1.3},
the degradation ratio is computed as (1.3−0.7)/(1.3+0.7+1.3) = 18.2%.
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scheduling cycle (e.g., 100 seconds in our experiment) reduce
due to less auctions. We evaluate these two kinds of auction
overheads separately. The simulation setting is similar to that
of Figure 6, except we will change the value of K.
For energy consumption, we assume that there is a fixed
cost per auction, as in Figure 7 (a). When the cost per auction
is zero, social welfare decreases with the segment number K
due to the difficulty in accurately predicting future channel
conditions when auctioning a larger number of segments
in a single auction. As the cost per auction increases, the
social welfare decreases, but a larger K may be better than
K = 1 because of its smaller total overhead. For the time
consumption, we assume that there is a fixed time per auction
as in Figure 7 (b), and we consider different ratios between
this time per auction with the video segment length β. As time
per auction increases, social welfare decreases, and a larger K
becomes better than K = 1 because of its smaller time waste.
C. Realistic Performance over the Demo System
We further perform experiments over the demo system
introduced in Section VII. The bitrates set is {0.5, 1.0, 2.2,
5.0}Mbps, and the segment length β = 10s.
1) Welfare Increase for High and Low Capacity Users: In
this experiment, four users {A,B,C,D} form a group in a CMS
system: user A and B do not watch videos and have cellular
link capacities around 3.5Mbps; user C and D watch two
different videos and have cellular capacities around 1.2Mbps.
Figure 8 shows the video scheduling results of users C and
D in one experiment. The meanings of curves and stems are
similar as that in Figures 3. In Figure 8, although user C and
D have link capacities around 1.2Mbps, they can download
TABLE III
WELFARE COMPARISON
Noncooperation Cooperation
A and B 0% 15.5%
C and D 49.1% 84.5%
Social Welfare 49.1% 100%
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videos at the bitrate of 2.2Mbps most of the time and do not
suffer from rebuffer due to the help from users A and B.
Table III shows users’ average normalized welfare over
four experiment rounds. We normalize the social welfare
(i.e., the sum of all the users’ welfares) in cooperation as
100%. Without cooperation, users A and B receive zero social
welfare, as they do not watch videos. Users C and D receive
less than 50% of the cooperative total social welfare. Under
cooperation, users A and B receive 15.5% of the social welfare
due to the payments from the auction (subtracting their own
costs for helping other users). For user C and D, their welfare
increases 35.4% compared with noncooperation due to the
service enhancement. The overall social welfare also increases
50.9% compared with noncooperation.
2) Video Streaming Stability: We consider two users, A
and B, both of which watch different videos and have cellular
capacities around 3.6Mbps. User A is always connected to
the Internet, while user B is disconnected from the Internet
between 50 to 220 seconds. Figure 9 demonstrates the result
of an experiment. The notations are similar to that of Figure
8. Although user B’s video bitrate decreases from 2.2Mbps to
1.0Mbps during the time he is disconnected from the Internet,
he is still able to watch the video with the help from user A.
This demonstrates the practical benefit of the CMS system.
IX. CONCLUSION
The CMS system enables mobile users to share their down-
loading capacities for cooperative video streaming. The suc-
cess of this system requires an effective incentive mechanism
that motivates user cooperations. In this work, we propose
truthful and efficient mechanisms that maximize the social
welfare. We further construct a demo system to evaluate the
real world performance of the CMS system. For the future
work, it is interesting to design mechanisms that enable the
cooperation among users who will encounter in the future,
based on the prediction of their future mobility.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Given any bitrate rm, a bidder m’s score will be φm =
Um,t(r
m) − s(rm) if bidding truthfully using price pm =
Um,t(r
m), and φ′ = p′ − s(rm) if bidding untruthfully using
price p′ 6= Um,t(rm). We will show that bidder m cannot
obtain a higher payoff by bidding φ′ 6= φm (or p′ 6= pm),
which implies that bidding with price pm (truthful bidding) is
a weakly dominant strategy for bidder m.
According to Mechanism 1, regardless of what price that
bidder m bids, he will obtain a zero payoff if he loses the
auction, and he will obtain a payoff of Pm(p†, r†) if he wins,
Pm(p
†, r†) = Um,t(r†)− p†
= Um,t(r
m)− (max{φNn/m}+ s(rm))
= φm −max{φNn/m},
(47)
where max{φNn/m} is the maximum score other than bidder
m’s. Hence, if bidder m loses (or wins) under both φ′ and φm,
he will gain the same payoffs under both the scores. If he loses
under φ′ and wins under φm, he will gain a zero payoff under
φ′, and gains a payoff of φm−max{φNn/m} > 0 under φm.
If he wins under φ′ and loses under φm, he will gain a zero
payoff under φm, and gains a payoff of φm−max{φNn/m} <
0 under φ′, where the negative payoff is due to the fact that
bidder m loses under φm. In each of the cases above, bidder
m cannot obtain a higher payoff by bidding φ′ 6= φm.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
The key idea is to show that, for any bid (r¯m, p¯m), there
always exists a bid (rˆm, pˆm), which leads to an expected
payoff of bidder m that is no smaller than the bid (r¯m, p¯) does.
Such a bid (rˆm, pˆm) satisfies two properties: i) the bitrate rˆm
is computed based on (19); ii) the price pˆm is chosen such
that φ(rˆm, pˆm) = φ(r¯m, p¯m), which means that both bids
(rˆm, pˆm) and (r¯m, p¯m) lead to the same score and hence the
same winning probability. If bidder m loses the auction under
such a score, then the payoff will be zero under both bids. If
bidder m wins the auction under such a score, then (rˆm, pˆm)
leads to a larger payoff than (r¯m, p¯m), i.e.,
Um,t(rˆ
m)− (max{φNn/m}+ s(rˆm))
≥ Um,t(r¯m)− (max{φNn/m}+ s(r¯m)). (48)
Inequality (48) holds because rˆm satisfies equation (19).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose all bids except those of bidder m’s are fixed, so
the K highest marginal scores except bidder m’s, Sˆ−m =
{Sˆ−m1 , Sˆ−m2 , ..., Sˆ−mK } (in the non-increasing order), are fixed.
We further assume that bidder m’s bitrate matrix Rm is fixed.
If bidding truthfully, bidder m will submit a price pm =
(pm1 , p
m
2 , ..., p
m
K), where p
m
κ = Um,t(r
m
κ ) for all κ. Under such
a price, bidder m will win κ†m segments, and has a payoff Pm:
Pm = Um,t(r
m
κ†m
)− (
κ†m∑
i=1
Sˆ−m
K−κ†m+i
+ s(rm
κ†m
)). (49)
Let Sm = {Sm1 , Sm2 , ..., SmK} denote bidder m’s marginal
score vector (derived from his bids) under the truthful bidding,
where Sm satisfies Assumption 1. Because of the truthfulness,
the marginal score summation satisfies
∑κ
i=1 S
m
i = p
m
κ −
s(rmκ ) = Um,t(r
m
k )−s(rmk ) for all κ. Moreover, the marginal
scores of those bidders who win should be no smaller than
the marginal scores of those bidders who do not win. Bidder
m (with marginal scores Sm) wins κ†m segments, so any of
the first κ†m marginal scores (winning marginal scores) in S
m
should be no smaller than any of the last κ†m marginal scores
(losing marginal scores) in Sˆ−m. The bidders except bidder
m (with marginal scores Sˆ−m) win K−κ†m segments, so any
of the first K−κ†m marginal scores (winning marginal scores)
in Sˆ−m should be no smaller than any of the last K − κ†m
marginal scores (losing marginal scores) in Sm. Formally,
Smi ≥ Sˆ−mj , i ≤ κ†m, j ≥ K − κ†m + 1, (50)
Sˆ−mj ≥ Smi , i ≥ κ†m + 1, j ≤ K − κ†m. (51)
If bidding untruthfully, bidder m will submit a price p¯m =
(p¯m1 , p¯
m
2 , ..., p¯
m
K). Under such a price, bidder m will win κ¯
†
m
segments, and has a payoff P¯m:
P¯m = Um,t(r
m
κ¯†m
)− (
κ¯†m∑
i=1
Sˆ−m
K−κ¯†m+i
+ s(rm
κ¯†m
)). (52)
According to above discussions, we show that bidder m
cannot obtain a higher payoff by submitting p¯m 6= pm, i.e., we
will show Pm−P¯m ≥ 0. Considering three possible situations:
• If κ†m = κ¯
†
m, then Pm − P¯m = 0.
• If κ†m > κ¯
†
m (loses segments by untruthful bidding), then
Pm − P¯m =
κ†m∑
i=κ¯†m+1
Smi −
κ†m−κ¯†m∑
i=1
Sˆ−m
K−κ†m+i
≥ 0. (53)
• If κ†m < κ¯
†
m (gains segments by untruthful bidding), then
Pm−P¯m = −
κ¯†m∑
i=κ†m+1
Smi +
κ¯†m−κ†m∑
i=1
Sˆ−m
K−κ¯†m+i
≥ 0. (54)
Inequalities (53) and (54) are obtained based on (50) and (51).
D. Proof of Proposition 4
For any bidder m, we will show that given any bid
(R¯m, p¯m), there always exists a bid (R˜m, p˜m) that leads to
an expected payoff (for bidder m) that is no smaller than that
achieved by bid (R¯m, p¯m). The bid (R˜m, p˜m) satisfies two
properties: i) bitrate R˜m is obtained from Proposition 4, ii)
the marginal score vector of the bid (R˜m, p˜m) is the same
as that of the bid (R¯m, p¯m), which implies that the two bids
will win the same number of segments, denoted by κ†m.
If κ†m = 0, bidder m’s payoff is zero under both the bids. If
κ†m > 0, bidder m’s payoff under (R˜
m, p˜m) and (R¯m, p¯m)
are as follows:
P˜m = Um,t(r˜
m
κ†m
)− (
κ†m∑
i=1
Sˆ−m
K−κ†m+i
+ s(r˜m
κ†m
)), (55)
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P¯m = Um,t(r¯
m
κ†m
)− (
κ†m∑
i=1
Sˆ−m
K−κ†m+i
+ s(r¯m
κ†m
)). (56)
As bitrate Rm is derived through maximizing Um,t(r)− s(r)
under the segment number constraints, i.e.,
Um,t(r˜
m
κ†m
)− s(r˜m
κ†m
) ≥ Um,t(r¯mκ†m)− s(r¯
m
κ†m
),∀κ†m (57)
Hence, P˜m ≥ P¯m. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
E. Proof of Lemma 1
First, we prove that the non-zero elements in the optimal
bitrate rmκ should be in the ascending order, i.e., r
m
κ1 ≤ rmκ2 ≤
... ≤ rmκκ. We prove this through contradiction. Suppose the
optimal bitrate rmκ is not in the ascending order. By reordering
the elements in rmκ in ascending order, we obtain a new
vector r¯κ. Note that V Qm,t(·) and V Bm,t(·) in the bidder’s utility
Um,t(·) are independent of bitrate order, and the auctioneer n’s
downloading cost Cn,t(·) is also independent of the bitrate
order. The degradation loss LQDm,t(·), however, is minimized
when the non-zero elements in rκ are in the ascending order.
Hence, we have the following inequality
Um,t(r¯κ)− Cn,t(r¯κ) ≥ Um,t(rmκ )− Cn,t(rmκ ), (58)
which contradicts the definition of the optimal bitrate, i.e.,
rmκ = arg maxrκ (Um,t(rκ)− Cn,t(rκ)). This proves the
ascending order of non-zero bitrate elements.
Next, we prove that the non-zero elements in optimal
bitrate rmκ should be identical, i.e., r
m
κi = r
m
κ ∀i ≤ κ. To
simplify the presentation, we define a function gmn,t(r) =
vQm,t(r) − cn,t(r), r ∈ Rm. Among the finite bitrate set Rm,
there exists an optimal bitrate, denoted by r∗ ∈ Rm, that
maximizes the concave function gmn,t(r). As we have shown
that the non-zero bitrates will be in the ascending order, the
only possible bitrate degradation is the degradation from RPREm,t
(i.e., the bitrate of the last segment from the previous auction)
to rmκ1 (the bitrate of the first allocated segment in this auction).
Hence, we can rewrite the bitrate vector optimization problem
as follows:
rmκ = arg max
rκ
(
κ∑
i=1
gmn,t(rκi)− lQD(RPREm,t, rκ1)
)
. (59)
We show rmκi = r
m
κ , ∀i ≤ κ in the following two cases:
• If RPREm,t < r
∗, then we know that bitrate r∗ maximizes
gmn,t(r) and minimizes lQD(RPREm,t, r) among the feasible
set r ∈ Rm. Hence, the optimal bitrate vector rmκ satisfies
rmκ1 = r
m
κ2 = ... = r
m
κκ = r
∗.
• If RPREm,t ≥ r∗, then we prove the identical bitrate result
as follows. First, we have bitrates r∗ ≤ rmκ1 for the
following reasons. If rmκ1 is the optimal value for rκ1,
then the partial derivative of the objective function in
(59) with the respect to rκ1 at rκ1 = rmκ1 should be zero,
i.e., [gmn,t(rmκ1)]rκ1 − [lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ1)]rκ1 = 0. Hence,
[gmn,t(r
m
κ1)]rκ1 ≤ 0, which implies that r∗ ≤ rmκ1 holds
because gmn,t(·) is concave and is maximized at r∗.
Second, the concave function gmn,t(r) is non-increasing
in r for r ≥ rmκ1 ≥ r∗. We have proved that rmκ1 ≤ rmκ2 ≤
... ≤ rmκκ, so gmn,t(rmκ2), gmn,t(rmκ3), ..., gmn,t(rmκκ) are
maximized when bitrates rκ2, rκ3, ..., rκκ are minimized
under the constraint that rmκ1 ≤ rmκ2 ≤ ... ≤ rmκκ, which
implies rmκ2 = ... = r
m
κκ = r
m
κ1.
F. Proof of Lemma 2
According to Lemma 1, the optimal common non-zero
bitrate rmκ for each row κ is derived as follows:
rmκ = arg max
r
(
κ · gmn,t(r)− lQD(RPREm,t, r)
)
. (60)
We prove that rκ is non-increasing in row index κ by checking
two cases:
• If RPREm,t < r
∗, then bitrate r∗ maximizes κ · gmn,t(r) −
lQD(RPREm,t, r) for any κ. Hence, r
m
1 = r
m
2 = ... = r
m
K =
r∗.
• If RPREm,t ≥ r∗, then bitrate r∗ ≤ rmκ = rmκ1 (proved in
Property 1). The optimal bitrate rmκ and r
m
κ+1 satisfy:
rmκ = arg max
(
κ · gmn,t(r)− lQD(RPREm,t, r)
)
; (61)
rmκ+1 = arg max
(
κ · gmn,t(r)− lQD(RPREm,t, r) + gmn,t(r)
)
.
(62)
Function gmn,t(·) is concave and non-increasing in r
when r ∈ Rm and r ≥ r∗. Suppose rmκ < rmκ+1. Then
based on the definition of rmκ , we have
κ · gmn,t(rmκ+1)− lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ+1) + gmn,t(rmκ+1)
< κ · gmn,t(rmκ )− lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ ) + gmn,t(rmκ ), (63)
which contridicts to the definition of the optimal bitrate
rmκ+1. Hence, r
m
κ ≥ rmκ+1 for all κ = 1, 2, ...,K − 1.
This completes the proof for Lemma 2.
G. Proof of Proposition 5
Considering efficient score function in (38), if a bidder m
bids according to Proposition 3 and 4, then the bidder’s score
for being allocated a total of κ segments is given:
φm,n,tκ =maximize
r
Um,t(r)− Cn,t(r)
subject to ri > 0, i = 1, ..., κ,
ri = 0, i = κ+ 1, ...,K,
variables ri ∈ Rm, i = 1, ..., κ.
(64)
Hence, the conditions on the marginal scores in Assumption 1
can be written as equivalent conditions of φm,n,tκ as follows:
• Non-negative marginal score:
φm,n,tκ+1 − φm,n,tκ ≥ 0,∀κ = 1, 2, ...,K − 1 (65)
• Non-increasing marginal score:
φm,n,tκ − φm,n,tκ−1 ≥ φm,n,tκ+1 − φm,n,tκ , ∀κ = 1, 2, ...,K − 1
(66)
Next, we show that inequalities (43) and (44) are the
sufficient conditions for satisfying (65) and (66), respectively.
Non-negative: If vQm(r, θ) ≥ cn,t(r) for all r and θ, then
gmn,t(r) = v
Q
m,t(r) − cn,t(r) ≥ 0 always holds. Based on
Lemma 1, the score φm,n,tκ can be represented as follows:
φm,n,tκ = max
r
(
κ · gmn,t(r)− lQD(RPREm,t, r)
)
. (67)
17
Let rmκ and r
m
κ+1 be the optimal non-zero common bitrates for
rows κ and κ+ 1, respectively. Based on Lemma 1 and 2,
φm,n,tκ+1 = (κ+ 1) · gmn,t(rmκ+1)− lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ+1)
≥ (κ+ 1) · gmn,t(rmκ )− lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ )
≥ κ · gmn,t(rmκ )− lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ ) = φm,n,tκ , (68)
which proves that φm,n,tκ+1 − φm,n,tκ ≥ 0.
Non-increasing: The non-increasing marginal score require-
ment is equivalent to the following one:
(κ+ 1)gmn,t(r
m
κ+1)− 2κgmn,t(rmκ ) + (κ− 1)gmn,t(rmκ−1)
−lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ+1)−2lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ )−lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ−1) ≤ |∆˜|.
(69)
Based on Lemma 1 and 2, we derive the conditions for
satisfying inequality (69) in the following two cases:
• If RPREm,t < r
∗, the bitrate rmκ = r
m
κ−1 = r
m
κ−2 = r
∗.
Hence, inequality (69) is directly satisfied.
• If RPREm,t ≥ r∗, then the inequality (69) is satisfied if:
2(κ+ 1)(cn,t(r
m
κ )− cn,t(rmκ−1)) + lQD(RPREm,t, rmκ ) ≤ |∆˜|,
(70)
because gmn,t(·) is concave and non-increasing in r
when r ≥ r∗, and lQD(·) is non-increasing in r. Since
cn,t(r
m
κ )−cn,t(rmκ−1) ≤ cn,t(RZm)−cn,t(0) = cn,t(RZm),
lQD(RPREm,t, r
m
κ ) ≤ lQDm (RZm, 0), and κ+1 ≤ K, we have the
sufficient condition for non-increasing marginal score:
2K · cn,t(RZm) + lQDm (RZm, 0) ≤ |∆˜|. (71)
This completes the proof.
H. Implementation Issues
Here, we discuss various practical implementation issues of
the proposed crowdsourced framework.
First, we consider the implementation overhead of the
proposed auction, which mainly consists of the computation
overhead and the transmission overhead. The computing in-
volved in the auction (i.e., the determination of allocation,
price, and payment) mainly invokes a sorting algorithm, which
has a low complexity (e.g., Quicksort algorithm [36] has an
average time complexity of O(NK log(NK)), where N is
the number of bidders and K is the number of segments
per auction). The transmission overhead mainly involves the
waiting time needed to collect all bidders’ bids, which is set
to be 100ms in the demonstration system. Hence, it is much
smaller than the segment downloading time. For example, if
a segment has a bitrate of 3Mpbs and a playback time of 10
seconds, then the downloading time over a link with capacity
of 4Mbps will be 3× 10/4 = 7.5 seconds.
Next we consider the payment management in practice. One
approach is to consider a credit-based system [37], where
the users who receive helps pay credit (either virtual or true
currency) to the users who help them. Such a credit-based
system has been applied in commercial user-provided net-
works, e.g., FON (https://network.fon.com). To avoid potential
cheating behaviors in the payments, one needs to consider
either centralized management systems [38] or a third-party
entity [39] to supervise the transactions and service provisions.
Finally, we consider the security issues (e.g., impersonation
attack and denial-of-services) and the privacy issues (e.g., user
contents protection). In this regard, we can apply the related
solutions in the D2D literature that address similar issues, such
as the key management method [40] for the security issues and
the video encryption method [41] for the privacy issues.
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